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January 2002, Israeli forces captured
a Tongan-registered general cargo
ship in the Red Sea laden with 50
tons of arms. The Israeli authorities
claimed that the vessel, Karine A,
was on route to Yasser Arafat’s
Palestinian Authority.
June 2002, French authorities,
suspecting cocaine smuggling, seized
the Cambodian-registered vessel,
Winner. The Greek owners of this
vessel were subsequently charged
with drug trafficking, setting up a
criminal organisation and money
laundering.
THESE and other high profile
events have focused world
attention on the relationship
between open registers and
criminal acts. Indeed, a recent
OECD study into the ownership
and control of ships notes the
existence of “many compliant
ship registers” which provide
means for “potential terrorists to
effectively hide their identity
while engaged in such activities”.
In terms of drug trafficking,
another report notes that “illicit
drug traffickers use vessels
registered with states that offer a
convenient register”. A Wall
Street Journal article from
September 2002 assesses the
Bolivian flag as follows: “As the
fleet of vessels flying Bolivia’s flag
has expanded to more than 300
from just a handful a few years
ago, authorities have caught
scores of them trafficking narcot-
ics, hauling toxic waste, fishing
illegally and operating unsafely.”
The question is then, why is
there a relationship between
criminal activities and open
registration? The answer relates
to the nature of the regulatory
environments present in different
flag states. The differing forms
and strengths of regulation put in
place and enforced by flag states
give the shipowner differing
levels to which they may put
themselves at a distance from the
flag state control and self-regulate
their operations. It is these
differing levels of regulation in
which these kinds of illegal
activity are given their conditions
of existence, i.e. the potential for
a shipowner to operate as they
wish in the absence of effective
state power.
When a shipowner elects to
register their vessel under a
specific flag they become located
within a particular regulatory
environment. Through this act of
vessel registration, the shipowner
is covered by a number of rights
and obligations. Due to the
practice of international law
concerning ship registration, the
flag state is afforded the opportu-
nity to define these rights and
duties in any manner they see fit,
from the authoritarian to the
liberal, and the shipowners may
choose which environment they
feel is most amenable to vessel
operation.
Taking the perspective of
someone wishing to undertake
criminal activity, it is possible to
see these registers as an enabling
device to produce extensive layers
of corporate secrecy spanning
multiple jurisdictions, remove
any relationship between them
and the vessel, and have no
interference from the state
concerning the operations of the
vessel. Human intention and
action being what it is, for those
pursuing illegal activity such
registers are entirely suited to
their ends. Now, it would be
incorrect to claim that these
vessel registers are attempting to
provide outlets for criminal
activity. However, it does seem that
they produce regulations that are
insufficient to prevent such activity.
However, we have to be
careful in making claims about
causality here. The flag of con-
venience system does not cause
criminal activity, nor is it re-
stricted to it. Instead, the open
register system enables those
wishing to engage in criminal
activities with a ready-made
system that they can use to their
advantage. In essence these
opaque structures of vessel
ownership, low requirements for
the incorporation of offshore
business entities, limited registra-
tion requirements and the
absence of effective monitoring
procedures produce an environ-
ment which could be attractive to
those engaged in illegal activities.
However, it could also be seen as
a deregulated environment in
which the shipowner can stream-
line costs yet still maintain their
own standards.
The problem is that these
structures enable both kinds of
action, by providing, in some
instances, the utmost space for
self-regulation. Illegal activities
have been carried out on a
number of vessels attached to
these registers and the experience
of self-regulation in other sectors
of the economy have taught us
that free markets are wholly
inadequate to underwrite effec-
tive standards and guarantee the
legality of operations.  The
development of the open register
system has led to a situation in
which ship operators may choose
the regulatory regime they wish.
Essentially, within flag state law,
shipowners are provided with the
opportunity to: opt for a low
taxation regime; reduce legal
liability through the creation of a
single-ship company; employ
seafarers of any nationality and
combination they wish; follow
their own system of vessel
maintenance; and, choose which
organisation classifies their
vessels. However, in general, the
shipowner is also provided with
the opportunity to: hide their
identity under multiple dummy
corporations; register their vessel
with little or no checks from the
flag state; not maintain their
vessel; break fishing laws with
minimal consequence from the
flag state and engage in a range of
illegal activities in the absence of
directed state control. This
system creates the conditions for
a range of criminal activity as it
does for running a lean effective
business within the boundaries of
the law. Therefore, any attempts
to prevent the occurrence of
illegal activities conducted by and
through the maritime industry is
prone to significant difficulties.
A number of states have made
various attempts to overcome the
inherent deficiencies of the
system. Intergovernmental
organisations such as the Helsinki
Commission have been set up to
tackle the problem of pollution
utilising a combination of aerial
surveillance and developing
techniques that enable a link to
be made between oil pollution
and individual vessels. The
various port state control regimes
around the world are designed to
tackle the problem of substand-
ard vessels by developing a
comprehensive system of vessel
inspection, and creating a scheme
by which at-risk vessels may be
targeted. A recent directive by the
European Parliament, enables
vessel flying the flags appearing
on the Paris port state control
“black list” to be banned from
European Union waters.
A common theme to these
activities is that they tacitly
accept the falling out of the flag
state from the regulatory regimes.
These activities are not an
addition to flag state control but
a replacement, filling in for a
retreating flag state. The problem
with this kind of approach is that
it fails to address the central
structural conditions that enable
certain kinds of illegal actions. In
so doing, it is vulnerable to the
same criticisms laid at a criminal
justice system based upon the
principle of mass incarceration. It
simply misses the root cause of
the problem; the element that
gives illegal activity its freedom to
exist.
Addressing the issue of crime
on the sea from the perspective
of vessel registration requires a
reinterpretation of the role and
constitution of the flag state.
Flagging a vessel to a state should
have real consequence over and
above an exchange of monies.
This can only be addressed by
changing the function of the
flag state from a competitive
market for foreign income, to a
method of enforcing and
maintaining best practice. Flag
states will have to meet mini-
mum requirements that enable
them to act as a responsible
partner in the effective regula-
tion of the maritime industry. It
is only by redefining and
rebuilding the concept of the
flag state that the issue of open
registration and crime can be
tackled at its source. Although
such an approach will not free
the seas of crime, it will get rid
of a system that enables it.
Centre, looks at the
relationship between open
registers and criminal acts
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